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Do Machines Make History?

ROBERT L. HEILBRONER

The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.

MARX, *The Poverty of Philosophy*

That machines make history in some sense—that the level of technology has a direct bearing on the human drama—is of course obvious. That they do not make all of history, however that word be defined, is equally clear. The challenge, then, is to see if one can say something systematic about the matter, to see whether one can order the problem so that it becomes intellectually manageable.

To do so calls at the very beginning for a careful specification of our task. There are a number of important ways in which machines make history that will not concern us here. For example, one can study the impact of technology on the *political* course of history, evidenced most strikingly by the central role played by the technology of war. Or one can study the effect of machines on the *social* attitudes that underlie historical evolution: one thinks of the effect of radio or television on political behavior. Or one can study technology as one of the factors shaping the changeful content of life from one epoch to another: when we speak of “life” in the Middle Ages or today we define an existence much of whose texture and substance is intimately connected with the prevailing technological order.

None of these problems will form the focus of this essay. Instead, I propose to examine the impact of technology on history in another area—an area defined by the famous quotation from Marx that stands beneath our title. The question we are interested in, then, concerns the effect of technology in determining the nature of the *socioeconomic order*. In its simplest terms the question is: did medieval technology bring about feudalism? Is industrial technology the necessary and sufficient condition for capitalism? Or, by extension, will the technology of

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the computer and the atom constitute the ineluctable cause of a new social order?

Even in this restricted sense, our inquiry promises to be broad and sprawling. Hence, I shall not try to attack it head-on, but to examine it in two stages:

1. If we make the assumption that the hand-mill does “give” us feudalism and the steam-mill capitalism, this places technological change in the position of a prime mover of social history. Can we then explain the “laws of motion” of technology itself? Or to put the question less grandly, can we explain why technology evolves in the sequence it does?

2. Again, taking the Marxian paradigm at face value, exactly what do we mean when we assert that the hand-mill “gives us” society with the feudal lord? Precisely how does the mode of production affect the superstructure of social relationships?

These questions will enable us to test the empirical content—or at least to see if there *is* an empirical content—in the idea of technological determinism. I do not think it will come as a surprise if I announce now that we will find *some* content, and a great deal of missing evidence, in our investigation. What will remain then will be to see if we can place the salvageable elements of the theory in historical perspective—to see, in a word, if we can explain technological determinism historically as well as explain history by technological determinism.

I

We begin with a very difficult question hardly rendered easier by the fact that there exist, to the best of my knowledge, no empirical studies on which to base our speculations. It is the question of whether there is a fixed sequence to technological development and therefore a necessary path over which technologically developing societies must travel.

I believe there is such a sequence—that the steam-mill follows the hand-mill not by chance but because it is the next “stage” in a technical conquest of nature that follows one and only one grand avenue of advance. To put it differently, I believe that it is impossible to proceed to the age of the steam-mill until one has passed through the age of the hand-mill, and that in turn one cannot move to the age of the hydroelectric plant before one has mastered the steam-mill, nor to the nuclear power age until one has lived through that of electricity.

Before I attempt to justify so sweeping an assertion, let me make a few reservations. To begin with, I am fully conscious that not all societies are interested in developing a technology of production or in

channeling to it the same quota of social energy. I am very much aware of the different pressures that different societies exert on the direction in which technology unfolds. Lastly, I am not unmindful of the difference between the discovery of a given machine and its application as a technology—for example, the invention of a steam engine (the aeolipile) by Hero of Alexandria long before its incorporation into a steam-mill. All these problems, to which we will return in our last section, refer however to the way in which technology makes its peace with the social, political, and economic institutions of the society in which it appears. They do not directly affect the contention that there exists a determinate sequence of productive technology for those societies that are interested in originating and applying such a technology.

What evidence do we have for such a view? I would put forward three suggestive pieces of evidence:

1. *The Simultaneity of Invention*

The phenomenon of simultaneous discovery is well known.¹ From our view, it argues that the process of discovery takes place along a well-defined frontier of knowledge rather than in grab-bag fashion. Admittedly, the concept of “simultaneity” is impressionistic,² but the related phenomenon of technological “clustering” again suggests that technical evolution follows a sequential and determinate rather than random course.³

2. *The Absence of Technological Leaps*

All inventions and innovations, by definition, represent an advance of the art beyond existing base lines. Yet, most advances, particularly in retrospect, appear essentially incremental, evolutionary. If nature makes no sudden leaps, neither, it would appear, does technology. To make

¹ See Robert K. Merton, “Singletons and Multiples in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, CV (October 1961), 470–86.

² See John Jewkes, David Sawers, and Richard Stillerman, *The Sources of Invention* (New York, 1960 [paperback edition]), p. 227, for a skeptical view.

³ “One can count 21 basically different means of flying, at least eight basic methods of geophysical prospecting; four ways to make uranium explosive; . . . 20 or 30 ways to control birth. . . . If each of these separate inventions were autonomous, i.e., without cause, how could one account for their arriving in these functional groups?” S. C. Gilfillan, “Social Implications of Technological Advance,” *Current Sociology*, I (1952), 197. See also Jacob Schmookler, “Economic Sources of Inventive Activity,” *Journal of Economic History* (March 1962), pp. 1–20; and Richard Nelson, “The Economics of Invention: A Survey of the Literature,” *Journal of Business*, XXXII (April 1959), 101–19.

my point by exaggeration, we do not find experiments in electricity in the year 1500, or attempts to extract power from the atom in the year 1700. On the whole, the development of the technology of production presents a fairly smooth and continuous profile rather than one of jagged peaks and discontinuities.

3. *The Predictability of Technology*

There is a long history of technological prediction, some of it ludicrous and some not.⁴ What is interesting is that the development of technical progress has always seemed *intrinsically* predictable. This does not mean that we can lay down future timetables of technical discovery, nor does it rule out the possibility of surprises. Yet I venture to state that many scientists would be willing to make *general* predictions as to the nature of technological capability twenty-five or even fifty years ahead. This too suggests that technology follows a developmental sequence rather than arriving in a more chancy fashion.

I am aware, needless to say, that these bits of evidence do not constitute anything like a "proof" of my hypothesis. At best they establish the grounds on which a *prima facie* case of plausibility may be rested. But I should like now to strengthen these grounds by suggesting two deeper-seated reasons why technology *should* display a "structured" history.

The first of these is that a major constraint always operates on the technological capacity of an age, the constraint of its accumulated stock of available knowledge. The application of this knowledge may lag behind its reach; the technology of the hand-mill, for example, was by no means at the frontier of medieval technical knowledge, but technical realization can hardly precede what men generally know (although experiment may incrementally advance both technology and knowledge concurrently). Particularly from the mid-nineteenth century to the present do we sense the loosening constraints on technology stemming from successively yielding barriers of scientific knowledge—loosening constraints that result in the successive arrival of the electrical, chemical, aeronautical, electronic, nuclear, and space stages of technology.⁵

⁴ Jewkes *et al.* (see n. 2) present a catalogue of chastening mistakes (p. 230 f.). On the other hand, for a sober predictive effort, see Francis Bello, "The 1960s: A Forecast of Technology," *Fortune*, LIX (January 1959), 74–78; and Daniel Bell, "The Study of the Future," *Public Interest*, I (Fall 1965), 119–30. Modern attempts at prediction project likely avenues of scientific advance or technological function rather than the feasibility of specific machines.

⁵ To be sure, the inquiry now regresses one step and forces us to ask whether there are inherent stages for the expansion of knowledge, at least insofar as it ap-

The gradual expansion of knowledge is not, however, the only order-bestowing constraint on the development of technology. A second controlling factor is the material competence of the age, its level of technical expertise. To make a steam engine, for example, requires not only some knowledge of the elastic properties of steam but the ability to cast iron cylinders of considerable dimensions with tolerable accuracy. It is one thing to produce a single steam-machine as an expensive toy, such as the machine depicted by Hero, and another to produce a machine that will produce power economically and effectively. The difficulties experienced by Watt and Boulton in achieving a fit of piston to cylinder illustrate the problems of creating a technology, in contrast with a single machine.

Yet until a metal-working technology was established—indeed, until an embryonic machine-tool industry had taken root—an industrial technology was impossible to create. Furthermore, the competence required to create such a technology does not reside alone in the ability or inability to make a particular machine (one thinks of Babbage's ill-fated calculator as an example of a machine born too soon), but in the ability of many industries to change their products or processes to "fit" a change in one key product or process.

This necessary requirement of technological congruence⁶ gives us an additional cause of sequencing. For the ability of many industries to co-operate in producing the equipment needed for a "higher" stage of technology depends not alone on knowledge or sheer skill but on the division of labor and the specialization of industry. And this in turn hinges to a considerable degree on the sheer size of the stock of capital itself. Thus the slow and painful accumulation of capital, from which springs the gradual diversification of industrial function, becomes an independent regulator of the reach of technical capability.

In making this general case for a determinate pattern of technological evolution—at least insofar as that technology is concerned with production—I do not want to claim too much. I am well aware that reasoning about technical sequences is easily faulted as *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. Hence, let me leave this phase of my inquiry by suggesting no more

plies to nature. This is a very uncertain question. But having already risked so much, I will hazard the suggestion that the roughly parallel sequential development of scientific understanding in those few cultures that have cultivated it (mainly classical Greece, China, the high Arabian culture, and the West since the Renaissance) makes such a hypothesis possible, provided that one looks to broad outlines and not to inner detail.

⁶ The phrase is Richard LaPiere's in *Social Change* (New York, 1965), p. 263 f.

than that the idea of a roughly ordered progression of productive technology seems logical enough to warrant further empirical investigation. To put it as concretely as possible, I do not think it is just by happenstance that the steam-mill follows, and does not precede, the hand-mill, nor is it mere fantasy in our own day when we speak of the coming of the automatic factory. In the future as in the past, the development of the technology of production seems bounded by the constraints of knowledge and capability and thus, in principle at least, open to prediction as a determinable force of the historic process.

II

The second proposition to be investigated is no less difficult than the first. It relates, we will recall, to the explicit statement that a given technology imposes certain social and political characteristics upon the society in which it is found. Is it true that, as Marx wrote in *The German Ideology*, "A certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of cooperation, or social stage,"⁷ or as he put it in the sentence immediately preceding our hand-mill, steam-mill paradigm, "In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production, and in changing their mode of production they change their way of living—they change all their social relations"?

As before, we must set aside for the moment certain "cultural" aspects of the question. But if we restrict ourselves to the functional relationships directly connected with the process of production itself, I think we can indeed state that the technology of a society imposes a determinate pattern of social relations on that society.

We can, as a matter of fact, distinguish at least two such modes of influence:

1. *The Composition of the Labor Force*

In order to function, a given technology must be attended by a labor force of a particular kind. Thus, the hand-mill (if we may take this as referring to late medieval technology in general) required a work force composed of skilled or semiskilled craftsmen, who were free to practice their occupations at home or in a small atelier, at times and seasons that varied considerably. By way of contrast, the steam-mill—that is, the technology of the nineteenth century—required a work force composed of semiskilled or unskilled operatives who could work only at the factory site and only at the strict time schedule enforced by turning the machinery on or off. Again, the technology of the electronic age has

⁷ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (London, 1942), p. 18.

steadily required a higher proportion of skilled attendants; and the coming technology of automation will still further change the needed mix of skills and the locale of work, and may as well drastically lessen the requirements of labor time itself.

2. *The Hierarchical Organization of Work*

Different technological apparatuses not only require different labor forces but different orders of supervision and co-ordination. The internal organization of the eighteenth-century handicraft unit, with its typical man-master relationship, presents a social configuration of a wholly different kind from that of the nineteenth-century factory with its men-manager confrontation, and this in turn differs from the internal social structure of the continuous-flow, semi-automated plant of the present. As the intricacy of the production process increases, a much more complex system of internal controls is required to maintain the system in working order.

Does this add up to the proposition that the steam-mill gives us society with the industrial capitalist? Certainly the class characteristics of a particular society are strongly implied in its functional organization. Yet it would seem wise to be very cautious before relating political effects exclusively to functional economic causes. The Soviet Union, for example, proclaims itself to be a socialist society although its technical base resembles that of old-fashioned capitalism. Had Marx written that the steam-mill gives you society with the industrial *manager*, he would have been closer to the truth.

What is less easy to decide is the degree to which the technological infrastructure is responsible for some of the sociological features of society. Is anomie, for instance, a disease of capitalism or of all industrial societies? Is the organization man a creature of monopoly capital or of all bureaucratic industry wherever found? These questions tempt us to look into the problem of the impact of technology on the existential quality of life, an area we have ruled out of bounds for this paper. Suffice it to say that superficial evidence seems to imply that the similar technologies of Russia and America are indeed giving rise to similar social phenomena of this sort.

As with the first portion of our inquiry, it seems advisable to end this section on a note of caution. There is a danger, in discussing the structure of the labor force or the nature of intrafirm organization, of assigning the sole causal efficacy to the visible presence of machinery and of overlooking the invisible influence of other factors at work. Gilfillan, for instance, writes, "engineers have committed such blunders as saying

the typewriter brought women to work in offices, and with the typesetting machine made possible the great modern newspaper, forgetting that in Japan there are women office workers and great modern newspapers getting practically no help from typewriters and typesetting machines.”⁸ In addition, even where technology seems unquestionably to play the critical role, an independent “social” element unavoidably enters the scene in the *design* of technology, which must take into account such facts as the level of education of the work force or its relative price. In this way the machine will reflect, as much as mould, the social relationships of work.

These caveats urge us to practice what William James called a “soft determinism” with regard to the influence of the machine on social relations. Nevertheless, I would say that our cautions qualify rather than invalidate the thesis that the prevailing level of technology imposes itself powerfully on the structural organization of the productive side of society. A foreknowledge of the shape of the technical core of society fifty years hence may not allow us to describe the political attributes of that society, and may perhaps only hint at its sociological character, but assuredly it presents us with a profile of requirements, both in labor skills and in supervisory needs, that differ considerably from those of today. We cannot say whether the society of the computer will give us the latter-day capitalist or the commissar, but it seems beyond question that it will give us the technician and the bureaucrat.

III

Frequently, during our efforts thus far to demonstrate what is valid and useful in the concept of technological determinism, we have been forced to defer certain aspects of the problem until later. It is time now to turn up the rug and to examine what has been swept under it. Let us try to systematize our qualifications and objections to the basic Marxian paradigm:

1. *Technological Progress Is Itself a Social Activity*

A theory of technological determinism must contend with the fact that the very activity of invention and innovation is an attribute of some societies and not of others. The Kalahari bushmen or the tribesmen of New Guinea, for instance, have persisted in a neolithic technology to the present day; the Arabs reached a high degree of technical proficiency in the past and have since suffered a decline; the classical Chinese developed technical expertise in some fields while unaccount-

⁸ Gilfillan (see n. 3), p. 202.

ably neglecting it in the area of production. What factors serve to encourage or discourage this technical thrust is a problem about which we know extremely little at the present moment.⁹

2. *The Course of Technological Advance Is Responsive to Social Direction*

Whether technology advances in the area of war, the arts, agriculture, or industry depends in part on the rewards, inducements, and incentives offered by society. In this way the direction of technological advance is partially the result of social policy. For example, the system of interchangeable parts, first introduced into France and then independently into England failed to take root in either country for lack of government interest or market stimulus. Its success in America is attributable mainly to government support and to its appeal in a society without guild traditions and with high labor costs.¹⁰ The general *level* of technology may follow an independently determined sequential path, but its areas of application certainly reflect social influences.

3. *Technological Change Must Be Compatible with Existing Social Conditions*

An advance in technology not only must be congruent with the surrounding technology but must also be compatible with the existing economic and other institutions of society. For example, labor-saving machinery will not find ready acceptance in a society where labor is abundant and cheap as a factor of production. Nor would a mass production technique recommend itself to a society that did not have a mass market. Indeed, the presence of slave labor seems generally to inhibit the use of machinery and the presence of expensive labor to accelerate it.¹¹

These reflections on the social forces bearing on technical progress tempt us to throw aside the whole notion of technological determinism as false or misleading.¹² Yet, to relegate technology from an undeserved position of *primum mobile* in history to that of a mediating factor, both acted upon by and acting on the body of society, is not to write off

⁹ An interesting attempt to find a line of social causation is found in E. Hagen, *The Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, Ill., 1962).

¹⁰ See K. R. Gilbert, "Machine-Tools," in Charles Singer, E. J. Holmyard, A. R. Hall, and Trevor I. Williams (eds.), *A History of Technology* (Oxford, 1958), IV, chap. xiv.

¹¹ See LaPiere (see n. 6), p. 284; also H. J. Habbakuk, *British and American Technology in the 19th Century* (Cambridge, 1962), *passim*.

¹² As, for example, in A. Hansen, "The Technological Determination of History," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (1921), pp. 76-83.

its influence but only to specify its mode of operation with greater precision. Similarly, to admit we understand very little of the cultural factors that give rise to technology does not depreciate its role but focuses our attention on that period of history when technology is clearly a major historic force, namely Western society since 1700.

IV

What is the mediating role played by technology within modern Western society? When we ask this much more modest question, the interaction of society and technology begins to clarify itself for us:

1. *The Rise of Capitalism Provided a Major Stimulus for the Development of a Technology of Production*

Not until the emergence of a market system organized around the principle of private property did there also emerge an institution capable of systematically guiding the inventive and innovative abilities of society to the problem of facilitating production. Hence the environment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provided both a novel and an extremely effective encouragement for the development of an *industrial* technology. In addition, the slowly opening political and social framework of late mercantilist society gave rise to social aspirations for which the new technology offered the best chance of realization. It was not only the steam-mill that gave us the industrial capitalist but the rising inventor-manufacturer who gave us the steam-mill.

2. *The Expansion of Technology within the Market System Took on a New "Automatic" Aspect*

Under the burgeoning market system not alone the initiation of technical improvement but its subsequent adoption and repercussion through the economy was largely governed by market considerations. As a result, both the rise and the proliferation of technology assumed the attributes of an impersonal diffuse "force" bearing on social and economic life. This was all the more pronounced because the political control needed to buffer its disruptive consequences was seriously inhibited by the prevailing *laissez-faire* ideology.

3. *The Rise of Science Gave a New Impetus to Technology*

The period of early capitalism roughly coincided with and provided a congenial setting for the development of an independent source of technological encouragement—the rise of the self-conscious activity of science. The steady expansion of scientific research, dedicated to the exploration of nature's secrets and to their harnessing for social use,

provided an increasingly important stimulus for technological advance from the middle of the nineteenth century. Indeed, as the twentieth century has progressed, science has become a major historical force in its own right and is now the indispensable precondition for an effective technology.

* * *

It is for these reasons that technology takes on a special significance in the context of capitalism—or, for that matter, of a socialism based on maximizing production or minimizing costs. For in these societies, both the continuous appearance of technical advance and its diffusion throughout the society assume the attributes of autonomous process, “mysteriously” generated by society and thrust upon its members in a manner as indifferent as it is imperious. This is why, I think, the problem of technological determinism—of how machines make history—comes to us with such insistence despite the ease with which we can disprove its more extreme contentions.

Technological determinism is thus peculiarly a problem of a certain historic epoch—specifically that of high capitalism and low socialism—in which the forces of technical change have been unleashed, but when the agencies for the control or guidance of technology are still rudimentary.

The point has relevance for the future. The surrender of society to the free play of market forces is now on the wane, but its subservience to the impetus of the scientific ethos is on the rise. The prospect before us is assuredly that of an undiminished and very likely accelerated pace of technical change. From what we can foretell about the direction of this technological advance and the structural alterations it implies, the pressures in the future will be toward a society marked by a much greater degree of organization and deliberate control. What other political, social, and existential changes the age of the computer will also bring we do not know. What seems certain, however, is that the problem of technological determinism—that is, of the impact of machines on history—will remain germane until there is forged a degree of public control over technology far greater than anything that now exists.